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Stock Options for Directors in Small
Corporations
Robert H. Moore, Jr.*
T HE WALL STREET JOURNAL on April 3, 1962 reported Treasury
Secretary Douglas Dillon as condemning the existing tax
treatment of stock options but asking Congress to wait until next
year to make changes in the present law. Secretary Dillon said
that any changes should be considered as part of the Kennedy
Administration's general tax revision bill expected to be sent
to Congress late this year.'
The treatment stock options have received since the enact-
ment of Section 421 of the 1954 Code has come under much
criticism.2 Section 421 of the Code 3 authorizes the so-called "re-
stricted" stock options, and it is these options to which Secretary
Dillon undoubtedly was referring. It is not the purpose of this
paper, however, to enter the controversy about restricted stock
options but to consider the so-called "non-restricted" and to
suggest revisions in the law that appear merited with respect to
them. But first, it would be well to distinguish generally be-
tween these two types of options.
* B.A., Washington & Lee Univ., with Cert. in Commerce; M.B.A., Harvard
Business School; Secretary, Assistant Treasurer, Director, Otis & Co., Cleve-
land, Ohio; Director also: Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., Jewell Ridge Coal Sales
Co., Pocahontas Mining Co.; a Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1962, p. 2, col. 4 (midwest ed.).
2 Griswold, Are Stock Options Getting Out of Hand?, 38 Harv. Bus. Rev.
49 (1960); The Mysterious Stock Option, 2 Tax Revision Compendium 1327
(1959);
Griswold & Seligman, Should Small Companies Be Enabled to Adopt
Stock-Option Compensation Plans, 12 J. Taxation 20 (1960);
Mann, Are Stock Option Plans Ethical?, 93 J. Accountancy 324 (1952);
Wallace, Should We Continue to Encourage the Use of Restricted Stock
Options?, 39 Taxes 785 (1961);
Ware, Stock Purchase Options; Their Morality and Practical Applica-
tions, 41 Barrons 5 (1961) (Discussion: J. A. Livingston 41:6 (1961)) See
also Ware, 194 Comm. & Fin. Chr. 491 (1961);
Case Against Executive Stock-Option Plans, 41 Managem't Rev. 320
(1952);
Stock Option Hassle, 89 Chem. W. 106 (1961);
The Stock Option Scandal, Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO,
Washington, D. C. (1959).
U Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Sec. 421.
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Restricted Stock Options
Section 421(d) (1) of the Code4 defines a restricted stock
option as: ".... an option granted after February 26, 1945, to an
individual, for any reason connected with his employment by a
corporation, if granted by the employer corporation or its par-
ent or subsidiary corporation, to purchase stock of any of such
corporation. . ." under certain conditions. If these conditions are
strictly complied with: ". . no income shall result [to the
optionee] at the time of the transfer of such [optioned] share
to the individual [i.e., optionee] upon his exercise of the option
with respect to such share. . ." 5
The conditions permitting such favorable tax treatment are
that option price of the shares must not be less than 95% (or in
some cases 85%) of the fair market value of the shares to which
they relate on the day of the grant and the employee-optionee
must not dispose of the shares transferred to him as a result of
the exercise of his option for 2 years from the date of the grant or
within 6 months of the transfer of the shares to him. Whatever
amount he receives, then, upon the disposition of the shares, less
what he paid for them when he exercised his option, will be taxed
to him at capital gains rates.'
For the purpose of our discussion, the important part of this
Section 421 is the specific provision that limits those who qualify
for this special tax treatment to: ". . . an individual for any
reason connected with his employment by a corporation . . ." 7
Non-employees are expressly excluded.
Non-Restricted Stock Options
Non-restricted stock options are governed by Section 1.421-6
of the Income Tax Regulations of the 1954 Code.8 This class of
options is described by this section as "Options to which section
421 does not apply." 9 Specifically, Section 1.421-6(a)(1) pro-
vides:
4 Id. par. (d), subpar. (1). See 2 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, Sec.
1019 (1959).
5 Id. par. (a), subpar. (1).
6 Id. Sec. 421.
7 Id. par. (d), subpar. (1).
8 Treas. Reg., Sec. 1.421-6.
9 Id.
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If an employer or other person grants to an employee or
other person for any reason connected with the employment
of such employee an option to purchase stock of the employer
or other property, and if section 421 is not applicable, then
this section shall apply. [Emphasis supplied.] 10
The tax treatment applied by this section depends upon whether
the option has a readily ascertainable fair market value at the
time of grant. If it does, compensation results to the optionee-
employee (to be taxed at ordinary income rates) at the time of
grant in an amount equal to the excess of the fair market value
over what was paid for the option." If it does not, the optionee-
employee realizes compensation (to be taxed at ordinary income
rates) at the time an unconditional right to receive the stock
subject to the option is acquired (if at that time the stock is not
subject to a restriction which significantly affects its value), and
the amount of such compensation is the difference between the
amount payable for the stock and the fair market value of the
stock at the time an unconditional right to receive it is acquired
(or the restrictions lapse). 12 A significant difference between
this type of option and the restricted type is that the corporation
granting the option can take a deduction from its taxes in the
same amount and at the same time that the optionee realizes com-
pensation from the exercise of his option.
13
After this section was enacted, the Treasury was asked
whether the section covered options granted to non-employees
("or other person"). It answered that it did not, but that the
question was under study. 14 At the present time, only employees
of corporations qualify for either restricted or non-restricted
stock options.
10 Id. par. (a).
11 Id. par. (c), subpar. (1).
12 Id. par. (d), subpar. (1).
13 Id. par. (f).
14 I. R. S. Withdraws Proposals on Stock Options for Other Than Employees,
14 J. Taxation 159 (1961). See also I. R. S. Technical Information Release
No. 293 of 1/20/61.
By T. D. 6481, Sec. 1.421-6 (b) (2) was amended in 1960 to add the words
"employment" and "employer" in the definition of "employee." The effect
of this amendment is to remove any doubt that may have heretofore existed
as to whether non-employees could be considered as included with em-
ployees as qualifying for the tax treatment provided by this section.
Sept., 1962
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Non-Statutory Stock Options
Options for those other than employees are governed by
Section 1.61-2 of the Income Tax Regulations of the 1954 Code.16
Under the provisions of this section, non-employee optionees are
taxed at ordinary income rates on the difference between the
option price and the fair market value of the shares to which
the option relates on the date of the grant. When the stock is
sold, after exercise of the option, the amount received from the
sale, less the difference given above, is taxed to the optionee
at ordinary income rates.16
Therefore, under the present status of the law on stock
options, directors of corporations, unless they are also employees
thereof, are not eligible to receive the favorable tax treatment
of restricted or non-restricted stock options. It is important, in
the consideration that is being given to the revision of these sec-
tions, that corporate directors be included among those who
qualify for this special treatment.
Value of Stock Options for Small Companies
Dean Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School, when
he appeared in 1959 before the House Ways & Means Committee
when it was conducting hearings on tax reform, testified as fol-
lows:
It is in small and closely held companies that the stock option
device may have its clearest justification. It is in such com-
panies, perhaps, in need of better management, that an out-
sider can be brought in and given the real incentive through
a stock option of sharing in the investment of the company.
It is in such companies, too, that the effects of an individual
can have some impact on the value of the stock. 17
In a recent article in Taxes, Mr. Emmett Wallace of James
0. Rice Associates, Inc. of New York City considered the ques-
tion, "Should we continue to encourage the use of restricted
stock options?" One of his conclusions is particularly pertinent
to this discussion. He said:
Stock options do have one value for smaller companies which
is generally not sought by the larger firms: they provide a
mechanism for conserving cash through the offer of con-
15 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.61-2.
16 Id. par. (d), subpar. (2).
17 Griswold & Seligman, op. cit. supra, note 2.
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tingent compensation. Not only can stock options replace
salary payments, but there is cash inflow at the time options
are exercised. Small growing firms with limited working
capital may find stock options the only device available for
offering attractive compensation to their top executives.1s
The comments of Dean Griswold and Mr. Wallace were di-
rected at the use of restricted stock options to compensate execu-
tives, who, of course, would be employees of their corporations.
It is suggested in this paper that the provisions relating to non-
restricted stock options be broadened to permit directors to
qualify. Non-restricted as opposed to restricted has been selected
because it is thought that there is more economic justification to
the operation of this type, which, unlike the restricted, taxes
property at capital gains rates only when it has been placed at
risk.'9
Function of Directors
In an analysis of the answers received from the polling of a
large number of company directors on questions to do with the
subject: "How to utilize management's most neglected tool, the
board of directors," the author sums up the findings as: "...
[T]he board of directors is the best mechanism for bringing the
lessons of past experience to bear on the problems of the fu-
ture." 20 In answer to the question asked of these directors:
"How do you contribute to the growth and profit of the com-
pany?," the writer says:
The experience of the respondents leads them to the con-
clusion that breadth of experience is the chief factor in the
make up of a good board. The problems dealt with are al-
most necessarily "frontier" types of issues for which no pre-
cise precedent exists. In addition to being novel, the prob-
lems dealt with by the boards are large scale, basically im-
portant, and enormously complex. Legal, financial, tech-
nical, and organizational factors must be identified, weighed,
and properly evaluated. The pooled judgment of men with
wide variety in their backgrounds is required if such prob-
lems are to be solved . . . It is apparent that small com-
panies have the same problems as large. To solve them re-
18 Wallace, op. cit. supra, note 2.
19 Supra, note 8 at par. (c) (3) (ii).
20 Masterson, How to Utilize Management's Most Neglected Tool, the Board
of Directors. 30 Am. Bus. 23 (1960).
Sept., 1962
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quires harmonious and effective pooling of judgment of ex-
perienced men.21
But the question is, how can small companies attract such
men as directors? "The principal disadvantage of relying on out-
side directors is in the difficulty of obtaining capable people who
are willing to spend the amount of time which would be re-
quired to familiarize themselves in a responsible way with the
company's activities." 22 . . . "One might observe that the typical
outside board member receives compensation for this duty far
less than the value of his time and knowledge." 23
Inducing Directors to Serve
In a discussion of the book, The Director Looks At His Job
by C. C. Brown, Dean of the Graduate School of Business Ad-
ministration of Columbia University, and E. E. Smith of Mc-
Kinsey and Company of New York,2 4 Business Week magazine
gave the authors' findings on the problem of finding capable di-
rectors and inducing them to serve:
As one incentive, compensation of directors has been rising.
Even part-time outside directors now receive anywhere from
$3,500 to $15,000 a year, and one director reports he has
been offered substantially more as an incentive to serve.
But for men of the caliber companies want, taxes generally
wipe out this sweetening.25
In an article "Company Presidents Size Up the Boards,"
Dun's Review & Modern Industry reported the typical comment
of one of the presidents surveyed: "It takes considerable per-
suasion to induce a busy man to join your board . . . The re-
sponsibilities are fairly heavy, and the incentives are rather in-
tangible." 20
Business Week, in its discussion of Dean Brown and Mr.
Smith's book, says that the conclusions of the authors on the
21 Id.
22 Brown & Smith, The Director Looks at His Job, as quoted in 13 Mgt.
Methods 27 (1958).
23 Kennedy, Jr., & West, Jr., The Board of Directors; Its Composition and
Significance, 24 Advanced Mgt. 8 (1959).
24 Brown & Smith, The Director Looks at His Job, Columbia University
Press, N. Y. (1957).
25 The Directors Peer Into the Mirror, Business Week, p. 57 (Dec. 21, 1957).
26 Company Presidents Size Up the Board, 72 Dun's Review & Modern In-
dustry 40 (1958).
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payment of directors was that they should be compensated as
executives should: in relation to qualifications and perform-
ance.2 7 This is hardly the answer for the small company, how-
ever. The problems the small company board must deal with are
often as complex and time consuming as those faced by boards of
larger corporations, and there is not the prestige appeal of serv-
ing on the boards of many small companies that there is in serv-
ing on those of the larger corporations. Furthermore, the small
companies, in the many instances, simply cannot afford the cash
drain caused by directors' fees of sufficient size to attract the
caliber of men needed. Even if the small company were to of-
fer a top-flight executive a handsome retainer for service on
its board, because of the executive's high income tax bracket,
such fee would not be as much of an inducement to him as a
similar fee from a larger company where he might be associated
on the board with the "captains of industry." If it is admitted
that smaller companies have as pressing a need for strong and
capable direction from their boards as do the larger companies, a
solution should be sought to the problem of how to attract quali-
fied men to the small company boards by permitting these men
also to receive favorable tax treatment on options granted to
them in the stock of the corporations on whose boards they sit.
Indeed, it may be the only way such men can be so attracted.
Directors Fixing Own Compensation
There are, in general corporation law, some basic considera-
tions with respect to the granting of stock options to directors
as compensation that must be examined.2 8 On the right of di-
rectors to recover for their services to the corporation, Ohio
Jurisprudence has this to say:
It is the general rule that directors are presumed to serve
without compensation. [Citation omitted.] . . . Of course,
the directors are entitled to compensation where there is an
understanding to that effect or an express provision for
27 Supra, note 25.
28 See Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 1701.15, .16, .17, .19, and .60. Compare Model
Bus. Corp. Act Ann., Sec. 18A (1960); N. C. Gen. Stat., Sec. 55-45 (1960);
Purdon Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, Sec. 2852-612 (1958).
See 12 0. Jur. 2d 507, 508, 515, 521; 13 Am. Jur. 975, Sec. 1027 and p.
981, Sec. 1036; 5 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. ed.) Secs. 958, 1110, 2125, 2137,
2140, 2142, and 2143 (1952).
See, 2 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, Secs. 1019, 1020 (1959).
Sept., 1962
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compensation in the articles or the regulations. [Citation
omitted.] 29
In 1955, the Ohio Legislature enacted 1701.60 R. C. to get
around the troublesome problem of directors fixing their own
salaries. This section provides that directors, unless otherwise
prohibited by the articles or regulations of the corporation, have
the authority to fix their own compensation. On this point Ohio
Jurisprudence says:
Since the revision of the General Corporation Law, it is ex-
pressly provided that unless otherwise provided in the cor-
porate articles or regulations, the directors, by the affirma-
tive vote of a majority of those in office, and irrespective of
any personal interest of any of them, shall have authority to
establish reasonable compensation . . . for services to the
corporation by directors and officers . . . Despite this statu-
tory provision, it still remains the rule that the compensation
allowed must be reasonable.
Specifically, with respect to directors issuing shares to them-
selves, Ohio Jurisprudence says:
The principle that equity will not interfere with the man-
agement and control of the corporation's business as long
as the directors act within the scope of their authority and
are not guilty of violating their fiduciary obligations [cita-
tion omitted] is applicable to a purchase by a director of au-
thorized but unissued shares and to treasury shares. Ac-
cordingly, where all of the original issue of shares has not
been sold by the corporation, a director, with the consent
of the remaining directors, may purchase the unsold shares
when the transaction is free from fraud, beneficial to the
corporation, and will promote its objects [citations omitted]
. . . However, where it is apparent that the transaction is
neither bona fide nor beneficial to the corporation, the sale
of authorized but unissued shares to a director will be set
aside. [Citation omitted.] 31
Consideration in the Issuance of Shares to a Director
The primary question, then, in considering the matter of the
issuance of shares to a director, is what would constitute a "bona
fide" transaction that would be "beneficial to the corporation."
29 12 0. Jur. 2d 639, Sec. 515. And see Oleck, op. cit. supra, note 28.
30 Id. Sec. 521, p. 644.
31 12 0. Jur. 2d 630, Sec. 507.
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The single most important element of such a transaction is the
sufficiency of consideration to the corporation.3
2
. . . [T]he directors of a corporation cannot bestow such
benefits [i.e stock optiops] on executives or employees with-
out the corporation receiving some benefit or consideration
in return. In general, directors and majority stockholders
cannot make gifts of corporate assets for other than chari-
table purposes.33
The courts generally will not question the size of the option
granted by the board to an employee so long as it is not unreason-
able, holding that in the absence of fraud or some other vitiating
circumstance, the judgment of the directors thereon is conclu-
sive.34
A number of states have enacted statutes making the direc-
tors' judgment "as to consideration and the sufficiency there-
of" in connection with a stock option plan, conclusive in
the absence of fraud.35
Where there is stockholders ratification [of the option plan],
however, the burden of proof is shifted to the objector [ci-
tations omitted]. In such a case the objecting shareholder
32 "At the time of granting the option, there must be conditions in the option
plan, or in the circumstances, which reasonably assure the corporation that
it will receive the benefit for which bargained. Later resolutions or employ-
ment contracts cannot remedy the lack of consideration in the option
grants." Frankel v. Donovan (Del. Ch. 1956), 120 A. 2d 311.
See also Kerbs v. Calif. East. Airways (Del. Ch. 1951), 83 A. 2d 473,
rev'd (Del. 1952), 90 A. 2d 652, enforced (Del. 1952), 91 A. 2d 62; Gottlieb v.
Heyden Chemical Corp. (Del. Ch. 1951), 83 A. 2d 595, rev'd (Del 1952), 90
A. 2d 660, reargued in part (Del. 1952), 91 A. 2d 57, enforced (Del. 1952),
92 A. 2d 594; Dow v. River Farm Co., 243 P. 2d 95 (1952); Elster v. Amer.
Airlines, Inc., 106 A. 2d 202 (Del. Ch. 1954), 128 A. 2d 801 (Del. Ch. 1957),
148 A. 2d 343 (Del. Ch. 1959); Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 87 A.
2d 295 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1952).
See also 42 Marq. L. Rev. 422 (1959); 55 Mich. L. Rev. 135 (1956); 39 Va.
L. Rev. 335 (1953), particularly note 62 at p. 348 on "legal consideration."
33 Kuelthan, Consideration in Corporate Stock Option Plans, 42 Marq. L.
Rev. 442 (1959), citing Rogers v. Hill, 289 U. S. 582, 53 S. Ct. 731 (1933);
6A Fletcher Cyc. Corp., Sec. 2939 (1950). See also, 2 Oleck, Modern Corpo-
ration Law, Sec. 1020 (1959) as to other incentive plans.
34 Beard v. Elster, 160 A. 2d 731 (Del. 1960); Otis & Co. v. Penn. R. R., 61
F. Supp. 905 (E. D. Pa. 1945).
See also 49 Calif. L. Rev. 373 (1961) and 12 Vand. L. Rev. 280 (1958):
"A minority shareholder does not have grounds for complaint if the direc-
tors have inaugurated a program which they in their business judgment
reasonably believe will benefit the corporation. If the stock option plan is
so unwise or improvident as to constitute waste or a gift of the corporate
assets, then the individual directors should be held liable for their negli-
gence or fraud."
35 DeCapriles, Corporate Practice-a Symposium, 13 Vand. L. Rev. (1) 9
(1959), citing N. Y. Stock Corp. Law, Sec. 69 and Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
Sec. 157 (1953); see also Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 1701.16 and .19.
Sept., 1962
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must convince the court that no person of ordinarily sound
business judgment would be expected to entertain the view
that the consideration furnished by the individual directors
is a fair exchange for the options conferred. [citations
omitted.] 31
There are, then, two primary elements that must be in the
stock option plan, to avoid stockholder challenge, the reasonable
assurance the corporation will receive the benefits it bargained
for, and shareholder ratification.
Generally the consideration for option rights is based on fu-
ture services, and the most common benefits to the company
found to be sufficient are employment contract rights, and
the assumption or continuation of corporate duties by the
benefited employees. [citations omitted.] The Delaware
courts have taken the strict view of requiring that there be
conditions in the plant, or in the circumstances, which rea-
sonably assure that the corporation will receive the bene-
fits for which it bargained, i.e., that the consideration is not
illusory. The courts hold that the time for ascertaining
whether the option plans are supported by sufficient con-
sideration is not when the options are exercised but when
they are granted. [Citations omitted.] Therefore, in order
for the consideration to be sufficient the Delaware decisions
require (a) a benefit to the corporation, (b) bargained and
exchanged for the option, (c) with reasonable assurance in
the option plan, or in the circumstances, that the corpora-
tion will receive the benefit for which it bargained. These
requirements can easily be met, and future representative
suits avoided, by tying stock options to employment con-
tracts for a specific period. Greater insurance that the cor-
poration will receive the benefit for which it bargains is ob-
tained when the options are exercisable only after a specified
period of employment [citation omitted], preferably in in-
stallments, with the consideration to the corporation in each
installment reasonably commensurate with the benefits
granted. [Citations omitted.] 37
36 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 91 A. 2d 57, 58 (Del. Ch. Sup. Ct.
1952).
37 Day, The Nature of Consideration Required For a Valid Employee Stock
Option Plan, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 135 (1956).
See also: Kuelthan, op. cit. supra, note 33: "Sufficient consideration to
validate a plan may be the retention of key personnel, the acquisition of a
new employee, or the signing of a favorable employment contract, provided
there is a reasonable relationship between the value of the services to be
rendered by the employee and the value of the option." Citing Wyles v.
Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343; McQuillan v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F.
Supp. 693; Sandler v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 79 A. 2d 606; Holthusen v.
Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488; Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158 F. 2d 687.
(Continued on next page)
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This quotation relates to the adequacy of consideration with
respect to stock options granted to employees. Can a corpora-
tion assure itself that it can meet these standards of adequacy
in devising a plan for directors? What would be required would
be a plan which provided that, in return for the option granted,
the director would perform his services for a period of time be-
fore the option could initially be exercised, and that it then could
be exercised in installments as the services were performed. It
would be well to have prior stockholder approval of the plan
before putting it into effect.38
Corporation Contracting with Director for His Services
Directors of corporations are, of course, elected by the share-
holders, usually annually for a term of one year, but in some in-
stances for a longer term, such as three years. 39 The board of di-
rectors of a corporation could not, therefore, as an inducement to
get someone on to the board, promise that the person would be
re-elected a director each year for the option period; the most
the board could do would be to require that the person sought
promise to serve as a director if re-elected over this period, and
that if he faithfully performed his duties as director, his name
would be submitted to the shareholders each year as one of man-
agement's nominees. His option rights would be conditioned on
the performance of his duty as director and his continued re-
election as same during the option period. The plan would be
(Continued from preceding page)
Perlin, Jr., Stock Option Incentive Employment Contracts For Corpora-
tion Executives, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1179, 1181 (1949): "Although an employ-
ment contract is not specifically enforceable, the law is clear that it may
constitute valid consideration for a promise to issue stock of the employer
corporation." Citing Am. Dist. Co. v. Hayes Wheel Co. (D. C. Mich. 1918),
250 F. 109 at p. 115, rev. on other grounds (C. C. A. 6th, 1918), 257 F. 881,
cert. den., 250 U. S. 672, 40 S. Ct. 13 (1919).
Gruber v. C&O Railway Co., 158 F. Supp. 593 (N. D. Ohio 1958). Held:
An executive stock option plan is supported by sufficient consideration and
does not constitute a waste or gift of corporate assets where the rights
granted a participant are conditioned upon further rendition of his services.
Kerbs v. Calif. East. Airways, 90 A. 2d 652 (Del. 1952): "There was
some element, either in the plan itself or in the surrounding circumstances,
reasonably calculated to keep the optionee in the corporation's employ. We
do not think it is indispensable to bind the optionee by an employment
contract but there must be some circumstances which may reasonably be
regarded as sufficient to insure that the corporation will receive that which
it desires to obtain by granting the options."
38 See supra notes 34 and 36.
39 12 0. Jur. 2d 487, Sec. 388.
Sept., 1962
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drawn so that he could exercise his option, after a suitable wait-
ing period, over the period of time he had served on the board.
The only difference between an arrangement such as this and
those involving employment contracts is that in this the share-
holders each year would be able to ratify the arrangement. If
they felt that they were not receiving equivalent value, they
could terminate the arrangement by not re-electing the director
and letting him take whatever stock in the company he had
acquired up to that point through the exercise of his options.
Suggested Changes in Non-Restricted Stock Option Provisions
On the thesis then that small companies need to be able to
compete with the larger corporations in getting good men to
serve on their boards and that the stock option device would
appear to have a real justification and a valid function in per-
forming this service, what changes can be suggested to permit
their use therefor?
The first change to be suggested is specifically to permit
non-restricted stock options to be granted to non-employees of
corporations, that is, that Section 1.421-6 be broadened to in-
clude non-employee directors.
The second change has to do with the exercise of the option.
The Treasury does not consider the option exercised until the
optionee has an unconditional right to receive the shares there-
under.40 This regulation apparently is not in accord with Mr.
Justice Black's dictum in Commissioner v. LoBue, which held
that the optionee exercised his options by the bona fide delivery
to the corporation of his binding promissory note.4 1 It is sug-
gested that this regulation be changed to provide that so long
as the optionee, who in the exercise of his option pays for the
shares, either entirely or partially, by his note against which the
shares so acquired are held as security, and thereby obligates
himself under a bona fide debt, that he be considered as having
exercised his option when he gives his note and so obligates him-
self.
The third change has to do with the timing of the collection
of the tax. The spread between the value of the shares when
the option is exercised (or when there is an unconditional right
40 Supra, note 12.
41 Comm. v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 250 (1956), reversing and remanding
223 F. 2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1955), which had affirmed 22 T. C. 440 (1954).
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to receive the shares) and the amount received from the sale
or other disposition of the shares is taxed to the optionee at capi-
tal gains rates. Under suggestion Number 2 above, the period
for computing the capital gains tax would commence to run upon
the exercise of the option. It is suggested that the collection of
the tax incurred, both as to ordinary income and capital gains,
be deferred until the shares are sold, when cash would be avail-
able to pay the tax, or pass by gift or death.
This treatment would be liberal, but it has the effect of
throwing the risk of the ownership of the shares on to the
optionee, to be taxed according to the risk he has assumed and
the value he could add to the shares he had optioned.
These suggestions may create a problem in valuation. The
stock of many small companies, such as those we are talking
about, is difficult to value. It might develop that it would be
hard to assess the worth of the option at the time of grant so
that the optionee could determine what his ordinary income tax
liability was on such option when he exercised it. On this prob-
lem Robert J. McDonald of the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell
of New York has recently said in an article in the Journal of
Taxation:
The proper time to tax an item of property which is difficult
or impossible to value at the time of receipt is no new prob-
lem. For example, upon the liquidation of a corporation an
asset which is difficult to value is received, such as con-
tracts for a specific period. Greater insurance that the cor-
Susan J. Carter (170 F. 2d 911), for example, the court held
that the computation of the value upon liquidation is merely
postponed until it can be computed, and thereafter the
amount received is treated conceptually as measuring the
value received upon liquidation. . . . But the Service is not
quite satisfied with that doctrine as to valuation of property
upon liquidation. It now says in Rev. Rul. 58402 that upon a
liquidation, except in rare and unusual circumstances, the
assets received in liquidation must be valued, as in the case
of death, no matter how difficult it may be so to value them.
The Service also says that options, including employee op-
tions, are to be valued at death.42
Since the optionee and the granting corporation are the ones
who are to benefit from the grant of the option, it would seem
just that the burden of proving the value of the option at time
42 McDonald, I. R. S. Errs in Denying That Non-Restricted Options Can Be
Compensation at Grant, 12 J. Taxation 331 (1960).
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of grant be on them. Possibly the theory that should be used to
accomplish this is the one suggested above, that the options in
problem situations be valued at the time of grant as if at death,
and such proof and procedure applied.
What Congress had originally intended as a boon to the small,
closely held corporation has become a very real problem to
those self same corporations while creating a highly favor-
able situation for publicly held, nationally listed corporations
whose stock can be easily valued.
43
Possibly these suggestions will help in giving the small com-
pany the assistance, through favorable tax treatment of stock
options to persons whom it wants to attract as directors, that it
is said that Congress intended them to have.
43 Schlesinger, Selected Problems in the Use of Restricted Stock Options,
36 Taxes 709 (1958).
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